# 1NC

### Off

#### The first off is our critique of their rhetoric

#### War metaphors are constitutive – they mobilize action and foreclose debate

Lori Hartmann-Mahmud 2002 Centre College International Studies Asst Prof

Peace Review 14:4 (2002), 427–432 War as Metaphor

Metaphors are more than just literary devices used to evoke an image or emotion. They constitute powerful forms of language that can influence how a concept is perceived and understood. For example, one is taught that the discoveries made by Enlightenment philosophers replaced the somber period of ignorance known as the dark ages. Here the use of lightness and darkness as metaphors go beyond mere description. They promote a specific worldview that establishes a hierarchy of knowledge and belief systems. Similarly, the metaphor of war goes beyond description to evoke a powerful image of solidarity and commitment in the face of an evil enemy. If the metaphor is used to describe an ideological conflict, then war-like language permeates the society. The Cold War provides such an example. “War” as such did not occur between the two main protagonists but the Cold War rhetoric set the tone for domestic and international politics for more than a generation as fear and hatred of the “other” produced an extraordinary military build-up on both sides, and competing world views provided justification for quick accusations of treason aimed at respective domestic populations. More broadly, once declared, a “war” effort succeeds in narrowly focusing a government’s priorities for action at home and abroad. Declaring war on someone or something or some idea allows for a simplified policy agenda, a justification for reallocation of funds, and often a curbing of critical discourse on the issues, because to be anti-war is perceived to be unpatriotic, even treasonous. How could one not support a “war on poverty?” A “war on drugs?” A “war on over-population?” Recently, those who have questioned the “war on terrorism” in the United States have been accused of being unpatriotic citizens who undermine America’s cultural and political strength and leadership in the world (see William Bennett’s Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism). Dialogue and debate become silenced by the imminence and urgency of war.

#### War metaphors trade off with solutions via three mechanisms: simpliciation, depoliticization, root causes – this drives the social problems they oppose

Lori Hartmann-Mahmud 2002 Centre College International Studies Asst Prof

Peace Review 14:4 (2002), 427–432 War as Metaphor

In this essay I explore the implications of declaring war on a concept; in general, it delays or precludes the pursuit of effective solutions to glaring problems facing the international community, and the United States more specifically. In the last 40 years we have witnessed the declaration of “war” against various concepts such as drugs, poverty, overpopulation, and most recently, terrorism. The conceptual simplicity that the declaration of war accords the state, while rendering the problem seemingly manageable, has three major detrimental effects: it seeks to simplify the problem and thus prolong the inevitable confrontation with its complexity; it promotes an apolitical approach to the problem (that is, it cannot be debated in the public realm); and it discourages a search for root causes of the problem. Governments use the rhetoric of war to motivate a population to support action on social or political issues. While the intention of declaring war on a concept such as poverty or terrorism may be admirable in that it calls attention to the issue, it simultaneously diverts attention away from the very debates and discussions that are necessary for making inroads in resolving the problem. One way the rhetoric of war misleads is by using the language and metaphors of war to describe and diagnose concepts that are quite different from an enemy target. We talk about launching an attack on poverty or drugs. There is talk of the weapons that will be deployed against this enemy. The discussion proceeds as if the enemy is completely separate and distinct from our society. The rhetoric includes calls for a deep commitment to the war, with the state’s resources made available for the effort. In war, there is an army, an enemy, and weapons. There is a distinct starting point and a clear ending point. War is declared; the army targets the enemy and launches the appropriate weapons. The enemy is bombarded with a deluge of attacks. If the enemy is still not defeated, the problem is perceived as being not enough arms or not a big enough army. This general approach may be appropriate for traditional warfare where the enemy is a country or army; however, a war against a concrete enemy target is very different from a war against a social problem or concept. In my Women and Development course, I illustrate this point during discussions of overpopulation by asking students to imagine a bull’s eye target (that is, women of the Global South who have too many children) at which one aims a bow and arrow (usually birth control pills or condoms). If this effort does not succeed in reducing fertility rates then the assumption is made that the aim is inaccurate (that is, not “hitting” the women) or the quantity of ammunition (prophylactics) is insufficient! This approach precludes discussion about causes of overpopulation, cultural contexts, or local resistance to certain birth control strategies. For the war on drugs, the target is the supplier and the weapon of choice is often military aid sent to governments who can coerce their populations into ceasing drug production, or pesticide spray that kills the crops. Since it is a war on drugs, the suffering of those who make their living selling these crops and who are subsequently reduced to refugees or beggars is not considered a high priority (and may be counted as “collateral damage” in war terminology). In addition, little attention is paid to the military hardware build-up in the country in question, nor the violence that occurs as a result. For the war on poverty launched by President Lyndon Johnson in 1964, a request went out to men and women to “prepare long-range plans for the attack on poverty in their local communities.” This language resembles a call for military recruits and thus conceptualizes poverty as an exogenous entity. The implication then is that an army of volunteers will be sufficient to ward off the enemy called poverty. This approach distorts our vision of poverty, blocking any view that may see it as a symptom of the socio-economic system in place. By declaring war on a concept that is often impossible to separate from the society in question, that has no distinct beginning or end, and that is immune to narrowly defined, uni-dimensional “attacks,” the entire effort becomes misguided. Concepts and social phenomena are not readily addressed in a theater of war. Interestingly, if the goal of war is to destroy the enemy, the war metaphor’s weakness in representing concepts such as poverty or drugs is exposed even more clearly. Can we imagine a world without poverty or drug use? Probably not. The best our policies can do is to mitigate the suffering, abuse, and exacerbation of these social ills, and perhaps seek to address root causes. Complete destruction of the enemy is just not feasible in these cases. Employing war categories and terminology, the state is accorded a vocabulary that simplifies the problem at hand (for example, poverty) and the solution (war), thus rendering them both easily comprehensible to the public, and explicable in 30-second sound bites. Individuals fit nicely into the categories of “enemy,” “hero,” or “innocent victim,” and the weapons are clearly identified. States have always sought to represent their territory in a simpler, more legible, fashion. Tools such as maps and censuses are used for that purpose.

#### Their attempt to equate their case with war powers participate in war metaphor - it is better understood as struggle

Tom Gerety 2005 NYU Prof, Brennan Center for Justice

University of Cincinnati Law Review Fall, 2005 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 147 ROBERT S. MARK LECTURE: THE WAR DIFFERENCE: LAW AND MORALITY IN COUNTER-TERRORISM

Yes, we call it war - our struggle to fend off terrorist attacks on our nation and its citizenry. This is in its way a triumph, if a somewhat lonely one, in the overall American response to the security threats that we learned to take so seriously only after the suicide attacks of September 11, 2001. A few days of hesitation followed the attacks, as the President and his aides sought to make sense of the success of the attackers and to grasp their identities and their motives. But since then the Bush Administration has insisted on the terminology of war and an overall approach repeatedly characterized in terms of the war powers of the United States presidency. 1 This rhetorical triumph remains somewhat more localized than the Bush Administration may have hoped: American intellectuals on the Left have resisted the war metaphor from the outset, 2 arguing that it distorts the perspective we need to succeed in counter-terrorism. In Europe as well, and most notably in Spain since the Madrid train bombings, there has been explicit avoidance of the language of war. The French, the Dutch, and many others have made a point to challenge the American insistence that we are engaged in a "war against terror." For them it is a fight, a struggle, a battle, but not a war. 3 Their overall approach has been to deploy intelligence and police personnel against [\*148] what they take to be a massive international conspiracy by al-Qaeda and its allies in the most radicalized wing of modern Islam. Why do Americans call it a war? For the first few days after September 11, 2001, we were not sure what had happened, who was responsible, or what our response ought to be. Then President Bush spoke to both Houses of Congress and said that we were engaged in a war "unlike any other." 4 He called it that for a variety of reasons, and most Americans found it natural for a variety of reasons. He called it war because it began much as World War II did at Pearl Harbor, with an attack that was a devastating breach of national security, a military defeat, and a national tragedy. It was warlike in all its moral, psychological, financial, economic, and, above all, political effects. To cite just one example, its consequences for intelligence policy have been unfolding in a series of dramatic but unsettled reforms; these will surely continue for many years to come. These changes rival those of the Cold War in their breadth and ambition. September 11 did not change everything, despite that frequent claim, but it changed a lot. Americans may also find it natural to call it war because it involved national surprise at the work of what for all purposes, practical and spiritual, was a very new enemy. Of course, the United States had known of al-Qaeda for years, and had been repeatedly warned of the terrorist threat by experts like Richard Clarke. 5 But for all Americans the surprise was enormous. Americans were surprised at the vulnerability of our nation and the ambition and effectiveness of our enemy. There may be an echo of the Sputnik crisis in this: a dramatic event suddenly showed American weakness in the face of international competition. But the surprise that we felt also evokes the emotion that the young John F. Kennedy captured in Why England Slept. 6 Americans were asleep at the switch of national and international defense and intelligence, and al-Qaeda had found us out with horrifying success. For many decades and perhaps centuries, "war" has also connoted stringent collective effort and sacrifice to achieve a grim goal: the war on cancer, on poverty, on drugs, and on crime. My own favorite source for these uses of the implicit simile is William James's essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War," 7 where he argued for an all-out effort, ironically, to make pacifism work. James called it a "war against war." [\*149] What I want to examine in this Article is the "war difference," that is, the difference it has made in our thinking about counter-terrorism to characterize it as a war against terrorism. Some of the difference is legal, though in the age of undeclared war, that difference proves to be quite modest. Much of the difference combines law with politics, subtly and not so subtly shifting expectations and powers: towards the Executive as Commander in Chief, towards the military and away from the police, towards an emergency mentality in public affairs that tends to hurry, bully, and slight human rights and civil liberties. I will argue the largest difference is moral: the war difference brings with it different standards for the evaluation of our conduct in counter-terrorism.

#### The constitutive nature of metaphor is prior to thought and experience – our impact comparison is based on the ontology of perception, not merely magnitude

Zavadil, Jeffery. Department of Political Science Arizona State University "New Metaphor Theories: Implications for Interpretation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, TBA, TBA, Jan 05, 2006 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p68744_index.html>

<http://www.allacademic.com/one/prol/prol01/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=0ee4aefbd44f4a79a340bfcb90c16143>

The idea that language is metaphoric has received support of late from researchers in the cognitive sciences. Most prominently, linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson have been making the case that language is metaphoric and that metaphor constitutes basic patterns of cognition.92 Several thinkers have made an association between metaphor and cognition in the sense that a good metaphor helps us understand a puzzle or point of contention, as when we feel that something has “clicked” in our head and we “get it.”93 Lakoff and Johnson have systematically explored how this works, not only for novel metaphors but also for conventional, dead metaphors. Like Richards five decades earlier, they observe that “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.”94 They give a detailed and systematic argument against the classical comparison view, analyze and categorize many common metaphors, and support their claims empirically, aiming for a comprehensive theory of metaphor to serve as a basis for an “empirically responsible philosophy.”95 While their work generally corroborates the contextualist direction of the new metaphor theorists that I have discussed so far, at times they resort to a reductionist tack that deprioritizes context and potentially poses a problem for contextual interpretation. Lakoff and Johnson define metaphor in two ways. As people consciously experience it, “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.”96 But they also define it as a “cross-domain mapping,” which is descriptive at both the experiential level and the microscopic level of neural functioning.97 At the level of the individual brain cell, neural clusters exist which constitute a thought, cognition, memory, percept, etc. Thought consists, to a great degree, of an exchange of patterns of such clusters, a cross-domain mapping, in which one neural cluster propagates onto another at the level of cellular functioning in the brain.98 At the level of a human undergoing the experience of cognition, such cellular functioning is understood as a metaphor, in which a pattern of “entailments” (which Lakoff and Johnson define neurally but also seem similar to Black’s systems of associated commonplaces) is mapped from a “source domain” to a “target domain.”99 Lakoff and Johnson analyze metaphor’s operation at middle levels of analysis as well, at the level of what they call the “cognitive unconscious,” the pre-conscious operations of the brain that structure conscious thought.100 They thus theorize that metaphor is a matter of basic cognition, something hard-wired into the human brain by evolution.101 This cognitive functioning is the same regardless of whether the metaphor in question is novel or dead.102 Like Nietzsche and Richards, Lakoff and Johnson reiterate that what are traditionally called dead metaphors are actually conventional metaphors, “metaphors that structure the ordinary conceptual system of our culture, which is reflected in our everyday language.”103 They argue that most dead metaphors are in fact very much alive in the sense that, by remaining active in the cognitive unconscious, they continually provide structures and frameworks of understanding which guide thought, feeling, and action long after people have forgotten that they are metaphors.104 In contrast, insightful images that call attention to themselves and are recognized as metaphors are just novel metaphors. They go beyond the usual conventional system of metaphors and help humans understand new experiences by creating new meanings: “New metaphors have the power to create a new reality… Much of cultural change arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the loss of old ones.”105 These meanings, both old and new, make use of large parts of the brain and sensorimotor system, and use the power of imagery conjoined with reason to create comprehension: “Metaphor is thus imaginative rationality.”106 Human language and conceptual systems consist of metaphors, and therefore metaphors are “what go through the mind,” although most of these are usually neglected as dead ones. Lakoff and Johnson also support the idea that metaphor is constitutive by observing that metaphor cannot be paraphrased in terms of another metaphor or in literal terms without losing or altering the meaning of what was said; one cannot swap metaphors without changing the meaning of a statement. Aristotle’s idea that we can replace a metaphor with and “ordinary word” is mistaken.107 In their initial exploration on how metaphors order and structure conceptual schemes, Metaphors We Live By,108 Lakoff and Johnson classified many common metaphors into categories, such as spatial metaphors, orientational metaphors, substance metaphors, personification, etc. For example, we often conceptualize emotions with the spatial schema HAPPY IS UP, SAD IS DOWN; we think that THE MIND IS AN ENTITY; traditional syllogistic logic is based on the metaphor IDEAS ARE CONTAINERS; and of course there is the metaphor THE STATE IS A PERSON.109 In a similar vein Michael J. Reddy identified the “conduit metaphor” by which communication is often conceived.110 Lakoff and Johnson also explore complex metaphors in our culture that combine more basic ones: ARGUMENT IS WAR, IDEAS ARE STRUCTURES (or PLANTS or PRODUCTS or RESOURCES, etc.), TIME IS A RESOURCE, LOVE IS MADNESS, and so on. In their later work, Philosophy in the Flesh, they emphasize to a greater degree how numerous metaphors are related to the nature and organization of the body.111

#### Reject the war metaphors tying the affirmative to the topic.

#### Our rejection dissolves the affirmative’s war metaphors, which makes space for new metaphors to address all the impacts of the aff

Jack Lule 2004 Lehigh University

Journalism Studies, Volume 5, Number 2, 2004, pp. 179–190 War and its Metaphors: news language and the prelude to war in Iraq, 2003

An irony has shadowed the thrust of this research. War itself has proved to be an encompassing metaphor for many aspects of US social life. We often use war to speak of business, law, sports, medicine, politics, and other fields. Sontag wrote:

Abuse of the military metaphor may be inevitable in a capitalist society, a society that increasingly restricts the scope and credibility of appeals to ethical principle, in which it is thought foolish not to subject one’s actions to the calculus of self-interest and profitability. War-making is one of the few activities that people are not supposed to view “realistically”; that is, with an eye to expense and practical outcome. In all-out war, expenditure is all-out, unprudent—war being defined as an emergency in which no sacrifice is excessive. (Sontag, 1990, p. 99)

And so, our society has seen politicians and corporate leaders call for wars on drugs, poverty, fraud, waste, cancer, and AIDS. Though war can be, and must be, understood from numerous cultural, political, critical, and ideological vantage points, war is pervasive in our metaphorical understanding and we need to be especially vigilant to the use of war as metaphor and, conversely, to the metaphors that configure war. Lakoff (1991) stated:

There is no way to avoid metaphorical thought, especially in complex matters like foreign policy. I am therefore not objecting to the use of metaphor in itself in foreign policy discourse. My objections are, first, to the ignorance of the presence of metaphor in foreign policy deliberations, second, to the failure to look systematically at what our metaphors hide, and third, to the failure to think imaginatively about what new metaphors might be more benign.

For Lakoff and Sontag, interpretation and criticism can rescue people from metaphors that kill. Interpretation and criticism are a means “to dissolve the metaphors” (Sontag, 1990, p. 102) and a way to reveal “the unconscious system of metaphors that we use without awareness to comprehend reality” (Lakoff, 1991). As Sontag (1990, p. 182) noted, “the metaphors cannot be distanced just by abstaining from them. They have to be exposed, criticized, belabored, used up.” Through scholarship, discussion and interpretation, perhaps, the language of television news can be “exposed, criticized, belabored, used up.” The presence of metaphor in news discourse can be clearly shown and understood. The metaphors chosen can be identified and studied systematically, their implications made clear. And new metaphors—more thoughtful, encompassing, benign or instructive—can be offered for use. Such attention to the language of news can help inform reporting of war and guard against metaphors that kill.6

### Off

#### The second off is our critique of their method

#### Attempts to create new cultural systems of relation that do not recognize capital ensures the ability of capital to coopt it

Ebert and Zavarzadeh in 2008 (Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 27-29)

On the theoretical level, **the attacks on labor focused on the material logic**: the question that Sumner H. Slichter had raised, namely that the U.S. was "shifting from a capitalistic community to a laboristic one-that is to a community in which employees rather than businessmen are the strongest single influence." **This second** cultural **front developed new arguments for the legitimacy, permanence, and transhistorical moral and social authority of capitalism as an economic regime** that was seen as the condition of possibility for human freedom. This is what, for example, F. A. Hayek's writings did. Not only did they provide the grounds for a Neoliberal economics that marginalized Keynesianism, but they also offered an ethics and a philosophy for capitalism (The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism). In a subsequent move, **post-theory** ("post" as in postcolonialism, postrnarxism, poststructuralism, etc.) **translated Neoliberal economies into a new philosophy of representation that made discourse the primary ground of social reality**. Discourse was not simply a "text" in its narrow sense but the ensemble of the phenomena in and through which social production of meaning takes place, an ensemble that constitutes a society as such. **The discursive is** not. therefore, **being conceived** as a level nor even as a dimension of the social, but rather **as being co-extensive with the social**.. .. There is nothing specifically social which is constituted outside the discursive, it is clear that the non-discursive is not opposed to the discursive as if it were a matter of "'1'0 separate levels. History and society are an infinite text. (Laclau, "Populist Rupture and Discourse" 87) **Class in post-theory was turned into a trope whose meanings are wayward and indeterminate**-**a metaphor for a particular language game** (Jenks, Culture 4). **This move has de-materialized class by hollowing out its economic content and turning its materialism into "a materiality without materialism and even perhaps without matter**" (Derrida, "Typewriter Ribbon" 281). **This** de-materializing **has taken place through a network of "post**" interpretive **strategies: Such as "destruction**" (Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 22- 23); **"deconstruction"** (Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend"); **"schizoanalysis"** (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 273-382); **"reparative reading"** (Sedgwick, Touching Feeling 123-151), **"cultural logic"** (Jameson, Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism); **"performativity"** (Butler, Gender Trouble); **"immaterial labor"** (Hardt and Negri, MultItude), **and "whatever** (qualunque)" (Agamben, The Coming Community). **The goal of both the populist and** the **theoretical campaigns against the labor movement**-which capital often referred to as "socialistic schemes" (Fones- Wolf 52}---**has been the blurring of class lines by depicting class antagonisms as cultural differences,** and to persuade people that, as Wallace F. Bennett, chairman of the National Association of Manufacturers put it, **"We are all capitalists"** (quoted in Fones-Wolf 70-73). In other words, **as far as capitalism is concerned, there are no class differences in the U.S. and what makes people different are their values, lifestyles, and preferences. We call this obscuring of class relations by cultural values and the play of language the "cultural turn."** The term "cultural turn" is often used to designate a 'particular movement in social and cultural inquiries that acquires analytical authority in the 1970s and is exemplified by such books as Hayden White's Metahistory and Clifford Geertz's The Interpretation of Cultures , both of which were published in 1973. White describes history writing as a poetic act and approaches it as essentially a linguistic (tropological) practice (Metahistory ix). **The view of history and social practices as poiesis**-which is most powerfully articulated in Heidegger's writings and is re-written in various idioms by diverse authors from Cleanth Brooks through Jacques Derrida to Giorgio Agamben-**constitutes the interpretive logic of the cultural turn**. Geertz's argument that culture is a semiotic practice, an ensemble of texts (Interpretation of Cultures 3- 30), canonizes the idea of culture as writing in the analytical imaginary. **The cultural tum is associated by some critics with the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s,** whose cultural activism they assume energized rebellion against "scientific" social and cultural inquiries and ushered in the cultural tum with its linguistic reading of culture and emphasis on the subjective (Bonnell and Hunt, ed., Beyond the Cultural Turn 1-32). **Other critics have also related the cultural tum to the radical activism of the post-1968 era and to postmodemism as well as to a tendency among radical intellectuals,** as Larry Ray and Andrew Sayer put it, **to approach language no longer as reflecting "material being" but to read it** (in Heidegger's words) **as the "house of being"** (Culture and Economy after the Cultural Turn I). **These and** similar **explanations of the cultural tum are insightful in their own terms**. However, **"their own terms" are not only historically narrow but are conceived within the very terms that they seem to critique: they are, in other words, accounts of the cultural tum from within the cultural tum**. As a result, **in spite of their professed interest in material analysis, their interpretations, like the writings of the cultural tum, remain culturalist. They** too **analyze culture in cultural terms**-that is, **immanently**. **Culture cannot be grasped in its own terms because its own terms are always the terms of ideology. Therefore to understand culture, one needs to look "outside**."

#### The focus on mediums of cultural significations, such as the body, creates an inversion of materialism that confuses the result of the modes of production with the cause. The reduction of materiality into materialism dehistoricizes class structures.

**Ebert and Zavarzadeh in 2008**(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 38-41)

**In order to represent media as** material, that is, **as economic**, **Hall reduces the economic to finance and banking**. His interpretation of the economic (and therefore of the base) is exemplary of the way the cultural tum has converted the material/economic into the cultural and placed (mostly aesthetic) values in place of labor. In Hall's scheme, **media are economic because they "sustain the global circuits of economic exchange on which the worldwide movement of information, knowledge, capital, investment, the production of commodities, the trade in raw material and the marketing of goods and ideas depend**" (209). **The economic in his narrative is exchange** (of what is obviously produced somewhere else). It is, in short, "trade," which in Neoliberal economic theories is the source of wealth (Hayek, *The Fatal Conceit;* Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom).* The dynamic of Hall's economics is the movement of capital across borders through banking systems, stock markets, and other financial activities. The media truncate the ... distances across which commodities can be assembled, the rate at which profits can be realized (reducing the so-called 'turn-over time of capital'), even the intervals between the opening time of different stock markets around the world-the minute time-gaps in which millions of dollars can be made or lost. (210) **The fact that the media make money does not turn them into material/ economic agents. Money**, itself, **is not a material object** (as positivists maintain), **nor is it the materiality of a "sign" or the sign of materiality,** as such Left writers as Gayatri C. Spivak have argued and who, after some relays, represent economics/economy as a structure of writing-textuality in play ("Speculation on Reading Marx: After Reading Derrida" 41). **Economy is "the material basis of the world"** (Marx, *Capital* I, 175), and **its structure is not** one **of representation but** of **objective class interests**, or as Engels puts it, "**'economics deals not with things but with relations between persons, and** in the last resort, **between classes**, these relations are, however attached to things and appear as things" (Engels, "Review of Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy"* 514). **Media speed up the process of realizing "profit**" made at the point of production. Thus, **they remain secondary and dependent on the materialism of the relations of production**. **The** quiet, mediated **redefinition of the material and economic and the** consequent **substitution of banking for production** put **money in place of** surplus **labor**, **trade in place of exploitation**, and **investment** **in place of class** relations. **Hall is**, of course, **repeating a cultural notion of the economic, wealth and work popularized by bourgeois economics in which "supply and demand" constitute the fundamental law and "trade" is the driving force in creating value** (Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations).* In the analytics of "base and superstructure," however, **the base is not finance capital. It is the totality of the relations of production** that are formed in connection with a particular level of productive forces. It is not about the "turnover time" of capital; it is about "production" of capital. **The source of wealth is not "interest"-**a representation legitimated by Jacques Derrida *(Specters of Marx)* and canonized in cultural theory (Jameson's "Culture and Finance Capital"; Kumar, ed., *World Bank Literature).* **Money does not produce** (more) **money**. **Profit is the effect of the particular social relations of capital and labor** that produce surplus value and not from trade or investment. . Hall's **erasure of base/superstructure-**as well as most of the other Left theory discourses aimed at demolishing the materialist analysis of culture- **depends on a theory of materialism that equates materialism with materiality.** But **materiality in these** Left **narratives is** actually a mode of **matterism**: **the me- dium of cultural practices**. **Since** all **cultural acts take place within a medium** eating, filming, writing, religion, etc.), **they are assumed to be material**, and in most Left theory, **this becomes the same as materialism**. **Equating the "material" (materiality) with "materialism" is one of the major contributions of Left writers to the legitimation of capitalism.** The issue here is not simply such innocuous subjects as the status of filmic apparatus or the tropes of a text or its affects. **What is at stake here are the conditions of historical possibility for all of these factors and their connections to the social relations of production within which they become what they are**. In other words, **the question of materiality and materialism is,** in the end, **a *class question.* By equating materiality and materialism, the Left obliterates the class lines dividing consumption from production, wages from profit, and capital from labor**. In doing so, **it normalizes the capitalist ideology that "We are all capitalists" and**, therefore**, concedes that there is not outside to the existing social relations**. The analytics of base/superstructure explains why--why the way people think is conditioned by the way they live and how this is determined by their place in the social division of labor. **Left theory has normalized the market's inversion of this relation**, and in subtle ways and through interminable relays, **it has implied that in the "new" times, the way people live is the effect of the way they think**. **Thought is given an independent existence that, furthermore**, **is endowed with the agency to produce the social world**. Here **the ideas of the Left converge with those of the Right** (Gilder, "Triumph Over Materialism") because both are products of the same class interests. **The Left in the global North has become the advance guard for the market's inversion of materialism into objective idealism (materiality):** it has accepted as given that if something exists in the mind it is real, and what is real is material and what is material is real. But, "**it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness"** (Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* 21). **To marginalize materialism, the** cultural **turn represents it as an object-ism, namely, an attempt to build a pre-figural origin for an ontology.** Subsequently, by following its familiar formula, **it "deconstructs" what it has constructed as an ontology ("**materialism") **into the rhetorical effects of tropes and concludes that materialism is spectral representation, inscription, and memory.** But **where speculation ends, materialism begins**. **Materialism is the worldliness of human practices**-**practices that** constantly **revolutionize** (the relations of) **production and make human history**, namely, the progress of humans toward freedom from necessity**. Materialism is the objective, productive activities of humans involving them in social relations under definite historical conditions that are independent of their will and are shaped by struggles between contesting classes over the surplus produced by social labor. A materialism that excludes historical processes is a theology of the corporeal.** Materiality, on the other hand, is the objective idealism of the cultural turn which, in the speculative tradition of Feuerbach, produces a spiritualized "materiality without materialism and even perhaps without matter" (Derrida, "Typewriter Ribbon" 281). It is **the** contemplative **corporeality of difference**, which is **the effect of the textual sensuality of language**-**the medium of representation, the body and its affective resistance to conceptuality and determinate meanings.** In the turn to culture, **materiality becomes a performativity**, **a species of meaning, an effect of archives, of memories, which is another way of saying: it is the effect of "matter as a sign**" (Butler, *Bodies That Matter 49).* **Matter**, however, **is not a sign or any other physical body, nor** is it **the self-alienated spirit** or an invention to support atheism (George Berkeley). **To identify matter with an object**, an indivisible atom or any immutable substance/ motion, or to equate it with a quanta of light, zero-dimensional point particles, or one-dimensional "strings" ("superstring theory"), **is to make the local modalities of matter absolute and to yield to the urge for physicalism and its metaphysical twin,** (unchanging) **substance**, **in bourgeois philosophy and its ontology and epistemology. Matter is objective reality in history-materialism; it is not corporeality-matterism**. **Owning a house and not owning a house are both social relations and both are materialist**-articulations of labor relations in history. **Matter is the shared property of the totality of different and transforming elements, historical processes, and social practices; these are independent from the will of the individual and exist in conflicts** (motion) **objectively outside the consciousness of the agent**. **The** cultural **turn disperses matter into substance** (body, language, sign ... ) **and** thus **dehistoricizes it-**separates matter from production and its contradictions-**and consequently "substantiates" the class interests of the owners.**

#### Class is the driver of all social and existential conditions. Only emancipation from the status quo modes of production can enact any form of human freedom

**Ebert and Zavarzadeh in 2008**(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p.ix-xii)

**Class** is everywhere and nowhere. It **is the most decisive condition of social life: it shapes the economic and**, consequently, **the social and cultural resources of people**. It determines their birth, healthcare, clothing, schooling, eating, love, labor, sleep, aging, and death. Yet **it remains invisible in the every day and in practical consciousness because,** for the most part, **it is dispersed through popular culture, absorbed in cultural difference, obscured by formal equality before the law or explained away by philosophical arguments**. Class in Culture attempts to trace class in different cultural situations and practices to make its routes and effects visible. However, the strategies obscuring class are cunning, complex, and subtle, and are at work in unexpected sites of culture. Consequently, this is not a linear book: it surprises class in the segments, folds, vicinities, points, and divides of culture. It moves, for example, from Abu Ghraib to the post-deconstructive proclamations of Antonio Negri, from stem cell research to labor history, from theoretical debates on binaries to diets. It is also written in a variety of registers and lengths: in the vocabularies of theory, the idioms of description and explanation, as well as in the language of polemics, and in long, short, and shorter chapters. Regardless of the language, the plane of argument, the length of the text, and the immediate subject of our critiques, our purpose has been to tease out from these incongruous moments the critical elements of a basic grammar of class-one that might be useful in reading class in other social sites. Our text on eating, for example, unpacks two diets that, we argue, reproduce class binaries in the zone of desire. The point here is not only when one eats, one eats class, but also class works in the most unexpected comers of culture, Eating as a sensuous, even sensual corporeality, is seen as the arena of desire which is represented in the cultural imaginary as autonomous from social relations. **Desire is thought to be exemplary of the singularity of the individual and her freedom from material conditions. One desires what one desires. Desire is the absolute lack: it is the unrepresentable.** We argue, however, that **one desires what one can desire; one's desire is always and ultimately determined before one desires it, and it is determined by one's material (class) conditions.** Our point is not that **individuality and singularity** are myths but that they **are myths in class societies**. **Individuality and singularity become reality**-not stories that culture tells to divert people from their anonymity in a culture of commodities-**only when one is free from necessity beyond which "begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself'** (Marx, Capita/III, 958-59). **Class is the negation of human freedom**. **A theory of class** (such as the one we articulate) **argues that class is the material logic of social life and** therefore it **determines how people live and think**. But this is too austere for many contemporary critics. ("Determinism" is a dirty totalizing word in contemporary social critique.) Most writers who still use the concept of class prefer to talk about it in the more subtle and shaded **languages of overdetermination, lifestyle, taste, prestige, and preferences**, **or** in the **stratification** terms of income, occupation, and even status. These **are all significant** aspects of social life, **but they are effects of class and not class**. This brings us to the "simple" question: What is class? We skip the usual review of theories of class because they never lead to an answer to this question. The genre of review requires, in the name of fairness, "on the one hand, on the other hand" arguments that balance each perspective with its opposite. The purpose of Class in Culture is not review but critique not a pluralism that covers up an uncommitted wandering in texts but an argument in relation to which the reader can take a position leading to change and not simply be more informed. This is not a book of information; it is a book of critique. To answer the question (what is class?), we argue-and here lies the austerity of our theory-**class is essentially a relation of property, of owning**. Class, in short, is **a relation to labor because property is the congealed alienated labor of the other**. By owning we obviously do not mean owning just anything. Owning a home or a car or fine clothes does not by itself put a person in one or another class. What does, is **owning the labor power of others in exchange for wages.** Unlike a home or a car, labor (or to be more precise "**labor power**") **is a commodity that produces value when it is consumed**. Structures like homes or machines like cars or products such as clothes do not produce value. Labor does. **Under capitalism, the producers of value do not own what they produce**. The capitalist who has purchased the labor power of the direct producers owns what they produce. Class is this relation of labor-owning. This means wages are symptoms of estranged labor, of the unfreedom of humans, namely the exploitation of humans by humans-which is another way to begin explaining class. **To know class, one has to learn about the labor relations that construct class differences**, that enable the subjugation of the many by the few. **Under capitalism labor is unfree**, it is forced wage-labor that produces "surplus value"-an objectification of a person's labor as commodities that are appropriated by the capitalist for profit. **The labor of the worker,** therefore, **becomes "an object" that "exits outside him**, independently, as **something alien to him, and it becomes a power on its own confronting him" which**, among other things, **"means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien**" (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,272). The direct producers' own labor, in other words, negates their freedom because it is used, in part, to produce commodities not for need but for exchange. **One**, therefore, **is made "to exist, first, as a worker; and, second as a physical subject**. The height of this servitude is that it is only as a worker that he can maintain himself as a physical subject, and that it is only as a physical subject that he is a worker" (273). Under wage labor, **workers**, consequently, **relate to their own activities as "an alien activity not belonging to [**them]" (275). **The estranged relation** of people to the object of their labor **is not a local matter but includes all spheres of social life**. ln other words, it is "at the same time the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects of nature, as an alien world inimically opposed to [them]" (275). **The scope of estrangement in a class society**, of human unfreedom caused by wage labor, is not limited to the alienation of the worker from her products. It includes the productive activity itself because what is produced is a "summary of the activity, of production," and therefore it is "manifested not only in the result but in the act of production, within the producing activity itself' (274). **The worker, in the act of production, alienates herself from herself because production activity is "active alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation**" (274)-an activity which does not belong to her. This is another way of saying that the activity of labor-life activity-is turned against the worker and "here we have self-estrangement" (275). In his theory of alienated labor, Marx distinguishes between the "natural life" of eating, drinking, and procreating which humans share with other animals and the "species life" which separates humans from animal. This distinction has significant implications for an emancipatory theory of classless society. "Species life" is the life marked by consciousness, developed senses, and a human understanding himself in history as a historical being because "his own life is an object for him" (276}--humans, as "species beings," are self-reflexive. To be more clear, "conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life activity" (276). The object of man's labor is the actualization, the "objectification of man's species-life" (277). Alienated labor, however, "in tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, ... tears from him his species-life" (277). Consequently, "it changes for him the life of the species into a means of individual life ... it makes individual life in its abstract form the purpose of life of the species, likewise in the abstract and estranged form" (276). This is another way of saying that **the larger questions that enable humans to build their world consciously are marginalized, and sheer biological living** ("individual life in the abstract") **becomes the goal of life in class society structured by wage labor. "Life itself appears only as a means to life"** (276). **Class turns "species life" into "natural life."** Since society is an extension of the sensuous activities of humans in nature (labor), **the alienation of humans from the products of their labor, from the very process of labor, which is their life activity, and from their species-being, leads to the estrangement of humans from humans (**277)-**the alienation in class societies that is experienced on the individual level as loneliness**. In confronting oneself, one confronts others; which is another way of saying that one's **alienation from the product of one's labor**, from productive activity, and from "species life" **is** at the same time **alienation from other people, their labor, and the objects of their labor**. In class societies, **work**, therefore, **becomes the negation of the worker:** he "only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself" (274). **Ending class structures is a re-obtaining of human freedom.** Freedom here is not simply the freedom of individuals as symbolized, for instance, in bourgeois "freedom of speech" but is a world-historical **"freedom from necessity**" (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme). **Class struggle is the struggle for human emancipation by putting an end to alienated labor** (as class relations). Alienated labor is the bondage of humans to production: it is an effect of wage labor (which turns labor into a means of living) and private property (which is congealed labor). **Emancipation from alienated labor is, therefore, the emancipation of humans from this bondage because "all relations of servitude," such as class relations, "are but modifications and consequences" of the relation of labor to production** (Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,280). **Class**, in short, **is the effect of property relations that are themselves manifestations of the alienation of labor as wage labor. Wage labor alienates one from one's own product, from oneself, from other humans, and, as Marx put it, "estranges the species from man**" (276).

#### Capitalism’s preoccupation with endless accumulation will result in total ecological destruction and extinction

Foster 11,[John Bellamy ] Dec. 2011, Capitalism and the Accumulation of Catastrophe, Monthly Review, Vol. 63 Issue 07, <http://monthlyreview.org/2011/12/01/capitalism-and-the-accumulation-of-catastrophe> (Aug 2012)

Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is *fairer*—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

#### Method is key- our alternative is dialectical materialism which provides the best method for understanding social and political relations-this education is key to achieve class consciousness and stop capitalism

**Lukacs in 67** (George, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic. He is a founder of the tradition of Western Marxism. He contributed the ideas of reification and class consciousness to Marxist philosophy and theory, and his literary criticism was influential in thinking about realism and about the novel as a literary genre. He served briefly as Hungary's Minister of Culture as part of the government of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, History and Class Consciousness)

If the question were really to be formulated in terms of such a crude antithesis it would deserve at best a pitying smile. But in fact it is not (and never has been) quite so straightforward. Let us assume for the sake of argument that recent research had disproved once and for all every one of Marx's individual theses. Even if this were to be proved, every serious 'orthodox' Marxist would still be able to accept all such modern findings without reservation and hence dismiss all of Marx's theses in toto—without having to renounce his orthodoxy for a single moment. **Orthodox Marxism**, therefore, **does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx's investigations**. It is not the 'belief in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a 'sacred' book. **On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to truth and that its methods can be developed, expanded and deepened** only along the lines laid down by its founders. It is the conviction, moreover, that all attempts to surpass or 'improve' it have led and must lead to over-simplification, triviality and eclecticism. Materialist dialectic is a revolutionary dialectic. **This definition is so important** and altogether so crucial for an understanding of its nature **that if the problem is to be approached in the right way this must be fully grasped before we venture upon a discussion of the dialectical method itself**. **The issue turns on the question of theory and practice**. And this not merely in the sense given it by Marx when he says in his first critique of Hegel that "theory becomes a material force when it grips the masses".1 Even **more to the point is the need to discover those features and definitions both of the theory and the ways of gripping the masses which convert the theory, the dialectical method, into a vehicle of revolution**. We must extract the practical essence of the theory from the method and its relation to its object. **If this is not done that 'gripping the masses' could well turn out to be a will o' the wisp**. **It might turn out that the masses were in the grip of quite different forces**, that they were in pursuit of quite different ends. **In that event**, there would be no necessary connection between the theory and their activity, **it would be a form that enables the masses to become conscious of their socially necessary or fortuitous actions, without ensuring a genuine and necessary bond between consciousness and action**. In the same essay\* Marx clearly defined the conditions in which a relation between theory and practice becomes possible. "It is not enough that thought should seek to realise itself; reality must also strive towards thought." Or, as he expresses it in an earlier work:3 "It will then be realised that the world has long since possessed something in the form of a dream which it need only take possession of consciously, in order to possess it in reality." **Only when consciousness stands in such a relation to reality can theory and practice be united. But for this to happen the emergence of consciousness must become the decisive step which the historical process must take** towards its proper end (an end constituted by the wills of men, but neither dependent on human whim, nor the product of human invention). The historical function of theory is to make this step a practical possibility. Only when a historical situation has arisen in which a class must understand society if it is to assert itself; only when the fact that a class understands itself means that it understands society as a whole and when, in consequence, the class becomes both the subject and the object of knowledge; in short, **only when these conditions are all satisfied will the unity of theory and practice, the precondition of the revolutionary function of the theory, become possible**. Such a situation has in fact arisen with the entry of the proletariat into history. "When the proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the existing social order,” Marx declares, "it does no more than disclose the secret of its own existence, for it is the effective dissolution of that order." \* **The links between the theory that affirms this and the revolution are not just arbitrary, nor are they particularly tortuous** or open to misunderstanding. **On the contrary, the theory is essentially the intellectual expression of the revolutionary process itself. In it every stage of the process becomes fixed so that it may be generalised**, communicated, utilised **and developed**. **Because the theory does nothing but arrest and make conscious each necessary step, it becomes at the same time the necessary premise of the following one**. <1-3>

#### Our method is the only way to stop capitalism-their knowledge only values individual epistemologies and identity. This cuts analysis off from the totality of capitalism ensuring the case fails.

**Lukacs in 67** (George, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic. He is a founder of the tradition of Western Marxism. He contributed the ideas of reification and class consciousness to Marxist philosophy and theory, and his literary criticism was influential in thinking about realism and about the novel as a literary genre. He served briefly as Hungary's Minister of Culture as part of the government of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, History and Class Consciousness)

**It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of totality**. **The category of totality, the** all-pervasive **supremacy of the whole over the parts is the essence of the method which** **Marx** took over from Hegel and brilliantly **transformed into the foundations of a wholly new science**. **The capitalist separation of the producer from the total process of production**, the division of the process of labour into parts at the cost of the individual humanity of the worker, **the atomisation of society into individuals** who simply go on producing without rhyme or reason, **must all have a profound influence on the** thought, the science and the **philosophy of capitalism**. **Proletarian science is revolutionary not just by virtue of its revolutionary ideas** which it opposes to bourgeois society, **but above all because of its method**. The primacy of the category of totality is the bearer of the principle of revolution in science. The revolutionary nature of Hegelian dialectics had often been recognised as such before Marx, notwithstanding Hegel's own conservative applications of the method. But no one had converted this knowledge into a science of revolution. It was Marx who transformed the Hegelian method into what Herzen described as the 'algebra of revolution\*. **It was not enough**, however, **to give it a materialist twist.** **The revolutionary principle** inherent in Hegel's dialectic **was able to come to the surface** less **because of** that than because of **the validity of the method itself, viz. the concept of totality**, the subordination of every part to the whole unity of history and thought. **In Marx the dialectical method aims at understanding society as a whole. Bourgeois thought concerns itself with objects** that arise either from the process of studying phenomena in isolation, or from the division of labour and specialisation in the different disciplines. **It holds abstractions to be 'real' if it is naively realistic, and 'autonomous' if it is critical**. **Marxism**, however, **simultaneously raises and reduces all specialisations to the level of aspects in a dialectical process**. This is not to deny that the process of abstraction and hence the isolation of the elements and concepts in the special disciplines and whole areas of study is of the very essence of science. **But what is decisive is whether this process of isolation is a means towards understanding the whole** and whether it is integrated within the context it presupposes and requires, **or whether the abstract knowledge of an isolated fragment retains its 'autonomy\* and becomes an end in itself.** In the last **analysis Marxism docs not acknowledge the existence of independent sciences of law, economics or history**, etc.: **there is nothing but a single, unifed— dialectical and historical—science of the evolution of society as a totality**. The category of totality, however, determines not only the object of knowledge but also the subject. **Bourgeois thought judges social phenomena** consciously or unconsciously, naively or subtly, consistently **from the standpoint of the individual**.1 **No path leads from the individual to the totality; there is at best a road leading to aspects of particular areas, mere fragments for the most part**, 'facts\* bare of any context, or to abstract, special laws. The totality of an object can only be posited if the positing subject is itself a totality; and if the subject wishes to understand itself, it must conceive of the object as a totality. In modern society only the classes can represent this total point of view. By tackling every problem from this angle, above all in Capital, Marx supplied a corrective to Hegel who still wavered between the "great individual and the abstract spirit of the people." Although his successors understood him even less well here than on the issue of'idealism' versus 'materialism\* this corrective proved even more salutary and decisive. <27-28>

### Case

#### Anti-blackness doesn’t cause social death or predetermine subjectivity- their arg is backwards

Brown 2009 (Vincent Brown, Professor of History and of African and African-American¶ Studies at Harvard University. December 2009, ¶ AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf)

Like scholars of resistance before him, Rucker effectively refutes any contention that the enslaved were socially dead. At the same time, his focus on the making of African American culture obscures a crucial dimension of the politics of slavery. In The River Flows On, resistance is the expression of culture, and peoplehood is the outcome of resistance, but Rucker places much less emphasis on the kinds of existential problems highlighted by Hartman and Smallwood. He does not ignore the violence of slavery, but he invokes bondage and its depredations as the antithesis of black self-making, rather than as a constitutive part of it. If for Hartman dispossession “had made us an us,” Rucker believes that resistance was the crucible in which black people forged identity from a vital inheritance. 41 How might his approach account for the dislocations, physical violations, and cosmic crises that preoccupy Hartman and Smallwood? Here is where scholars of retention and resistance may yet have something to learn from the concept of social death, viewed properly as a compelling metaphysical threat. African American history has grown from the kinds of people’s histories that emphasize a progressive struggle toward an ultimate victory over the tyranny of the powerful. Consequently, studies that privilege the perspectives of the enslaved depend in some measure on the chronicling of heroic achievement, and historians of slave culture and resistance have recently been accused of romanticizing their subject of study. 42 Because these scholars have done so much to enhance our understanding of slave life beyond what was imaginable a scant few generations ago, the allegation may seem unfair. Nevertheless, some of the criticisms are helpful. As the historian Walter Johnson has argued, studies of slavery conducted within the terms of social history have often taken “agency,” or the self-willed activity of choice-making subjects, to be their starting point. 43 Perhaps it was inevitable, then, that many historians would ﬁnd themselves charged with depicting slave communities and cultures that were so resistant and so vibrant that the social relations of slavery must not have done much damage at all. Even if this particular accusation is a form of caricature, it contains an important insight, that the agency of the weak and the power of the strong have too often been viewed as simple opposites. The anthropologist David Scott is probably correct to suggest that for most scholars, the power of slaveholders and the damage wrought by slavery have been “pictured principally as a negative or limiting force” that “restricted, blocked, paralyzed, or deformed the transformative agency of the slave.”44 In this sense, scholars who have emphasized slavery’s corrosive power and those who stress resistance and resilience share the same assumption. However, the violent domination of slavery generated political action; it was not antithetical to it. If one sees power as productive and the fear of social death not as incapacity but as a generative force—a peril that motivated enslaved activity—a different image of slavery slides into view, one in which the object of slave politics is not simply the power of slaveholders, but the very terms and conditions of social existence.

#### Their argument is historically inaccurate and methodologically bankrupt

 Brandom 2010 (Eric Brandom, Brown v Agamben V. Brown, 'Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery', The American Historical Review, 114, (2009), http://ebrandom.blogspot.com/2009/12/brown-v-agamben.html)

This essay is most straightforwardly a corrective to what Brown sees as the misuse (overuse) of Orlando Patterson’s categorical definition of slavery as social death. According to Brown, historians have often taken what Patterson meant as an ideal type definition to be a description of reality itself. Historians have long rejected, however, the basic result of such a definition: that it would strip slaves of agency. Manifestly, historians have pointed out, slaves had agency. One need look no further than the continuous rebellions and occasional revolutions to emerge from new world slavery to see this. Brown’s real goal, though, is deeper than this. In step with his historical work in The Reaper’s Garden, Brown wants to retell the story of slavery from the perspective of what we might call the micro-politics, or cultural politics, of everyday life. Brown argues that what he calls mortuary politics, conflict and negotiation over death, burial, and associated rituals, are of the greatest importance. One might make this argument in many contexts, but Caribbean slavery is a privileged field. Increasingly, it the worldview forged in the 18th century experience of slavery and revolution has come to be recognized as central to modernity as such (European, Atlantic, or even if you like, Capitalist). Mortuary politics is found to be central to the world of slavery, to the movement of the Haitian Revolution, and thus to modernity. One effect of Brown’s argument, or rather one consequence of the argument that he wants to make, is a firm and empirically-oriented rejection of Giorgio Agamben. Brown deals with this in a few paragraphs explaining the limits of an Agambenian perspective such as that taken in Ian Baucom’s Specters of the Atlantic. Agamben’s notion of bare life, for Brown, is piggybacked into the historical study of slavery as a sort of compliment to and intensification of Pattersonian social death. Brown doesn’t exactly want to re-open old debates about agency (vs structure!), but he does want to argue that it is plainly wrong to see Caribbean slaves as without culture, in the sense of without resources or community. He cites William Sewell’s recent definition of culture, commenting, “practices of meaning are better seen as tools to be used than as possessions to be lost.” There are several somewhat separable issues here. First, there is the methodological question of how one should think about culture and agency. In this, I simply agree with Brown. I prefer to treat culture (or, qua intellectual historian, unit ideas) as a bundle of tools to be manipulated—tools that empower, but also limit, channel, and react upon, those that wield them. Then there is the more empirical question of the admissibility and utility of the notion of ‘social death’ in the study of slave systems, say specifically in the Caribbean. Not having read all the relevant texts, I defer with enthusiasm to Brown. What I have read leads me to believe that he is entirely correct.

#### Aff’s Shakur iconography gets coopted – Kills solvency

James 99 Joy James Shadowboxing: Representations of Black Feminist Politics 1999 Presidential Professor of the Humanities and a professor in political science at Williams College Pg. Xiii

Chapter 4, "Radicalizing Feminisms from The Movement' Era." reviews the emergence and conflict! of feminism in the 1960s and 1970s. It offers working definitions of "radicalism" and "revolutionary" politics for contemporary struggles. Building Onthese definitions. "Revolution­ary Icons and 'Neoslave Narratives," chapter 5. examines several leaders in those movements, focusing on the radical Angela Davis, now public intellectual-academic, and the revolutionary Assata Shakur, currently in political exile in Cuba. In the 1970s, targeted for political activities but imprisoned on criminal charges, each woman mirrored archetypes shaped by Wells and Baker. At a time of mass, militant unrest, through bold confrontations with state authority, Davis and Shakur forged prototypes for I ate-twentieth-century black female radicalism. Rising public recognition for their contributions has led to a celebrity status— one that can transform the radical iconoclast into a deradicalized icon. The destruction or co-optation of radical movements was furthered by commodification and performative politics that simplistically reduced the revolutionary Malcolm X to an "X" insignia **on** apparel; the radicalism **of** the women's movement **to** bra-burning; and liberation politics to the slogans of stage personal. Since the 1970s, conservatism increasingly mainstreamed countermovements that challenged or dis-manded feminist and antiracist gains—ones modified and institutionalized by liberals—generated from the social upheavals engineered by militants. The rise of a commodified black female radicalism in popular iconography coexists with new forms of racial and economic contain­ment. As iconography deflects from contemporary repression and radical opposition, it promotes the disappearance of black female agency in political struggles.

#### Placing the black body at the center relegates other important factors that construct identities—their explanation falsely promises an emergence of social justice.

Niemonen, 2010 (Jack Niemonen, American Sociologist, 41(1), 48-81, “Public Sociology or Partisan Sociology? The Curious Case of Whiteness Studies” EBSCOhost)

Despite recognition that racial classification systems are not constant, proponents of whiteness studies treat whites as if they were an immutable, bounded, and cohesive category (Bonnett 2003; Eichstedt 2001; Gabriel 2000; Giroux 1997; Hartigan 1997; Keating 1995; Kincheloe 1999; Kolchin 2002; Levine-Rasky 2000; McCarthy 2003; Pugliese 2002; Sidorkin 1999; Yans 2006). They posit a generic white subject, both privileged and unaware of the extent of that privilege. However, even if whites coalesce at certain historical junctures, we cannot conclude that the category “white” is an entity that will continue indefinitely in the absence of antiracist initiatives (McDermott and Sampson 2005; Yans 2006; cf. Niemonen 2007). Reification has the unintended consequence of neglecting how the construction of racial identities is a negotiated, indeed manipulative, process (Bonnett 1998; Rockquemore 2002). In doing so, proponents of whiteness studies understate the contradictions, inconsistencies, and ambivalences within white and nonwhite identities. They assume before the fact that whites regard whiteness rather than nationality, ethnicity, religion, or class as the main factor that separates the civilized from the uncivilized. And, they oversimplify the challenges that nonwhites face by implying that their problems are largely race-related and hence attributable to racism (Croteau et al. 2002; Hartigan 2002; Kolchin 2002; Mansfield and Kehoe 1994; Warren and Twine 1997). Emphasizing the unifying interest in, and reproduction of, dominance minimizes how the boundaries of racial categories are negotiated, reinforced, or challenged in daily life (Alcoff 1998; Bash 2006; Perera 1999). Largely ignored are the complicated interactions between race, class, and sex, and the struggles of many whites to acquire privileges in a class-stratified society, especially economic security and some degree of self-autonomy (Bonnett 1997; Eichstedt 2001; Hartigan 1997, 2000b; Hubbard 2005; Kolchin 2002; Lee 1999; Winders 2003). Reifying the concept of race fails to capture the processes through which it acquires meaning, confers status, or exerts a “structuring effect” (Bash 2006; Lewis 2004). By suppressing intra-group divisions and contradictions, whiteness studies ignore how multiple statuses work together in people’s lives (cf. Brekhus 1998; Merton 1972) and perpetuate an “us-them” view of difference—the binary perspective that is at the core of racist discourses. The reification of racial categories endows them with causal potential and predictive ability, implying that all persons classified as white will exhibit the undesirable traits associated with whiteness, since being white is a condition with distinct, identifiable, but largely negative attributes that are in need of corrective attention (Alcoff 1998; Bash 2006; Hartigan 2000b; Keating 1995; Santas 2000; Scott 2000). In a reversal of the historical equation, “white” has become reprehensible whereas “nonwhite” has become virtuous (Gillborn 1996; Keating 1995). Whiteness studies posit racism as a mono-causal explanation for almost everything. All other forces, including the class struggle, are relegated to the margins. William Julius Wilson’s work is dismissed out-of-hand as a defense of the culture of poverty thesis (e.g., Harrison 1998; Ladson-Billings 1996; Welcome 2004). Racism is the problem. Therefore, whites either actively resist its reproduction or they perpetuate existing inequalities (Hartigan 2000b; Kolchin 2002; Moon and Flores 2000; Troyna 1994). This premise allows for the subsequent argument that whiteness is the source of oppression. If it is eradicated, then social justice will emerge (Moon and Flores 2000; Trainor 2002). Once whiteness is demonized, whites have no choice but to view their selves—ironically—in the context of a deficit model that identifies their failings, after which they may redeem themselves by becoming race traitors. Whites are required to renounce their whiteness but at the same time celebrate the alternatives. Such arguments inevitably result in anger and bafflement (Gillborn 1996; Kolchin 2002). The concept of racism suffers from conceptual inflation; it is used to mark any racially suspect attitude, behavior, policy, or practice (Blum 2002). It is defined as a property of whites who act against nonwhites (Gabriel 2000; Mansfield and Kehoe 1994; Pearce 2003). Whiteness studies proponents dodge the questions of whether or not whites can be victims of racism, and whether or not nonwhites’ atrocities against other nonwhites should be regarded as racist. They generally conclude that nonwhites cannot be racist, for the latter are not beneficiaries of a white-privileged world. Nonwhites lack the power to institutionalize the means that would disadvantage whites and advantage themselves (Eichstedt 2001; Gillborn 1996; Johnson et al. 2000; Ladson-Billings 1996; Tehranian 2000). Being cast as nonwhite means that one cannot escape thinking about race; it means being wounded, hurt, and hampered (Johnson et al. 2000; Leonardo 2004). Thus, in serving as a term of moral reproach, racism has joined vices such as dishonesty, cruelty, cowardice, and hypocrisy (Blum 2002).

#### Epistemology of provenance. Narratives and personal experience cannot effectively combat whiteness—the premise that rejects “Eurocentric” methods means the AFF cannot generate real sociological discussion.

Niemonen, 2010 (Jack Niemonen, American Sociologist, 41(1), 48-81, “Public Sociology or Partisan Sociology? The Curious Case of Whiteness Studies” EBSCOhost)

As opposed to recognizing that rationality, objectivity, and truth are themselves contested concepts that have been the subject of centuries of philosophical debate, whiteness studies conflate this history into a reductive, indeed monolithic, Eurocentrism. Painting Eurocentrism as the enemy creates the impression that it is static over time. It is caricatured as the claim that Western epistemology is omnipresent and wielded as a weapon of indoctrination against nonwhites. The struggle against Eurocentrism is transformed into an epistemological project in which the necessary, if not sufficient, condition for overcoming privilege is to disclose the truth about it (Kruks 2005). However, standpoint epistemologies may not constitute a satisfactory alternative (Aya 2004; Hammersley 1993). For example, on what grounds can the claim be made that one or more groups have privileged insight into reality? It cannot be declared before the fact; otherwise, all groups may make the same claim with no possibility of adjudication (Hammersley 1993). Although distinctive insights are possible—for example, as demonstrated in the work of Patricia Hill Collins—the claim that nonwhites have privileged access to the world whereas whites do not is implausible at best (Hammersley 1993; Srivastava 1996). Such an argument begs the question of how a correct perception of the world is achieved. In other words, the argument that personal experience occupies the same epistemological ground as social science is rife with logical and empirical problems. By grounding their framework on the epistemology of provenance (that only the oppressed can claim epistemic authority by virtue of their experiences), proponents of whiteness studies have blurred the distinction between scientific justification and folk beliefs. Personal experiences may be atypical or distorted by self-interest. Yet, to suggest so devolves into debates about the speaker’s authenticity and his or her right to speak. If an objective understanding of the world is impossible, then sociological concepts such as “concentration effects” may be more sophisticated, but no more valid, than the accounts offered by anybody else. If so-called higher values are little more than the hegemonic tactics of whites, and if the epistemology of provenance decides truth and falsehood, or right and wrong, then knowledge is local convention, and any outsider who disputes that claim is a racist (Aya 2004). Sociological research may not escape from normative concerns. However, this body of work is much more sophisticated than the proponents of witnesses studies claim (cf. Alba 1999; Bash 1979; Lee 1999; Lubienski 2003; Mckee 1993; Niemonen 2002). Even if the worth of this work should be evaluated by its public relevance, the claim on the part of whiteness studies proponents that its validity should be evaluated in the same way is questionable. Proponents of whiteness studies imply that true understanding is impossible across bounded groups because the latter construct discourses that—by virtue of the postulates of standpoint epistemology—cannot be communicated across boundaries without violating their authenticity (Sidorkin 1999). This premise creates a dilemma: How is it possible to appeal to social justice, while at the same time disavowing the possibility of authentic communication (Sidorkin 1999)? In fact, the boundaries between discourses are drawn too rigidly as a result of a conception of the social that is fixed, static, and homogenous (Merton 1972). In this context, whiteness is an arbitrary designation that underpins a political project that could not succeed in the absence of reification.

# 2NC

## Case

### Code Switching

#### Mutual respect- Both vernaculars have merit, incorporation in educational settings solves mutual respect

Jonsberg 2001 (Sara Jonsberg, teaches in the English Department at Montclair State University in New Jersey, “What's a (White) Teacher to Do about Black English?,” The English Journal, Vol. 90, No. 4, pg 51-53)

If we are going to celebrate diversity in our ¶ classrooms, we must learn to be respectful not just ¶ of various literatures, but of the various knowledges, rooted in various languages, that our students bring ¶ with them into the classroom. James Britton articulates in Language and Learning what has become ¶ a truism in progressive pedagogy: "... we must ¶ begin from where the children are: in other words ¶ there can be no alternative in the initial stages to ¶ total acceptance of the language the children bring ¶ with them ¶ .... From there I would go on to develop ¶ an awareness of difference among forms of speech" ¶ (134, emphasis mine). Lisa Delpit elaborates on the idea of developing an "awareness of difference." ¶ Drawing on Stephen Krashen's work in second lan- ¶ guage learning, she points out that the "less stress" ¶ that is placed on learning new or strange forms of ¶ speech, the more efficient will be the learning pro- ¶ cess (155). Delpit states that language competence ¶ may be defined as the ability to choose what form ¶ of language is most appropriate to a particular sit- ¶ uation. I suggest that competence also involves respect (which must include self-respect) for all variations. James Sledd has said that if we think students ¶ can comprehend the abstractions of subject and ¶ verb (and we do certainly behave as if we think they ¶ can understand these mysteries), then they can certainly comprehend the abstractions of race and class. ¶ They can, in other words, understand how the larger ¶ culture has come to value one dialect over another. They can learn that "good English" has to do with politics and power more than with aesthetics or immutable rules. They can learn to be critical of a tradition that uses language implicitly to measure a speaker's morality and social value-when, for ¶ example, variations are described as "corrupt" or ¶ "defective" or "broken." (See Williams.) ¶ They-and we--can learn not to talk about "bad English" and "good English" but rather about different forms of a living and continually changing English. They and we can learn not to talk about ¶ "correcting" language but rather about the rule structures of different dialects. Black English fol- ¶ lows a set of rules as much as Standard English does, ¶ but the distribution of power in our culture means ¶ it is easier to buy a traditional grammar book for ¶ Standard English than one for Black English. ¶ The distribution of power in our culture also ¶ means that certain kinds of "getting ahead" require knowing how to operate in what Smitherman calls ¶ LWC, the Language of Wider Communication. For ¶ this reason, we have an obligation as teachers to open up LWC to all our students, help them become ¶ fluent in it and be able to use it with comfortable fa- ¶ cility. To this end, we and our students together can ¶ find some ways to play with language that will bring ¶ all these ideas to the surface without pedantry and ¶ prescription, without alienation from either (or any) ¶ kind of speaking. Marlene Carter, for example, has ¶ used literature that code switches, such as stories ¶ that employ Black English in dialogue and LWC in ¶ narrations. Lisa Delpit suggests using role play. Brit- ¶ ton advocates various uses of drama. June Jordan, ¶ working with college students, invited them to com- ¶ pile a set of Black English grammar rules so they ¶ would understand that Black English is indeed a lan- ¶ guage and come to respect it more completely. ¶ If we really mean to provide access to learning ¶ for all, the way is clear. Baldwin offers the challenge: ¶ The brutal truth is that the bulk of the white people ¶ in America never had any interest in educating Black ¶ people ... It is not the Black child's language ... ¶ that is despised: It is his experience. A child cannot ¶ be taught by anyone who despises him, and a child ¶ cannot afford to be fooled. A child cannot be taught ¶ by anyone whose demand, essentially, is that the ¶ child repudiate his experience, and all that gives ¶ him sustenance, and enter a limbo in which he will ¶ no longer be Black, and in which he knows that he ¶ can never become white. Black people have lost ¶ too many Black children that way. (16) ¶ Most teachers in the United States are white. Many ¶ of the young people we teach are Black. There does not have to be a great gulf between us, a chasm of ¶ misunderstanding and disrespect, but the responsi- ¶ bility for bridging the space between rests not with ¶ the children, but with the teachers. We need to un- ¶ derstand, to know, and to live the history. We need to ¶ understand and believe and enact ideas about affir- ¶ mation and support. We need to seek out practical strategies for classroom action. Luckily, plenty of re- ¶ sources are available for teachers who want to trans- ¶ form classroom language practices so that all children will appreciate and respect the beauty and power of ¶ Black English. Let's get on with the important work ¶ of healing misunderstandings about this language.

### Iconography Link

#### It’s bad politics—coopts the aff—takes out the next level

James 99 Joy James Shadowboxing: Representations of Black Feminist Politics 1999 Presidential Professor of the Humanities and a professor in political science at Williams College Pg. 122

Progressive icons are significant because they function to popularize political movements and struggles. However, this popularization partly reflects selective political memory and representations skewed toward elite leadership and symbolism. Selective memory, masked by an uncritical valorization of icons, shields the contradictions of black political leadership from scrutiny while it deflects attention from revolutionary politics and rank-and-file leadership.45 Those who welcome the chiseling of a marble pantheon of (black) political celebrities likely believe any chipping away at reification to be icon vandalism; yet that "crime" is continuously perpe­trated within a racial state indifferent to or implicit in black impoverish­ment, one that meets political "resistance" with repression. Contemporary progressive culture is a consequence of past move­ment battles; yet it does not prevent the public from distancing those it wishes to claim as celebrated political insurgents from those who cannot or will not be mainstreamed. Every neoslave narrative is a freedom story. The diversity of politics within such narratives—whose ideologies range from neoliberal to revolutionary—suggests that revolutionary personas could be as mercurial and impermanent as fixed sites for freedom.

#### That iconography ensures that voices like Claudia Jones who was a fervent Marxist who also worked against racial oppression

Connie Johnson, (phd Texas), 2009 vol. 22, no. 1, Fall 2008-Spring 2009 Issue title: Politics and

In referencing both Hegel and Althusser, I posit in this essay that a space exists within Marx’s ideology for African-American participation. Though both Hegel and Althusser offer substantive theories which might explain the notion of the radical black feminist Marxist, an argument can also be made as to the futility of African-American involvement in the movement. Though Wilderson argues that blacks were never factored into the Marxist paradigm based on U.S. white supremacy, I hope to have provided ample evidence to the contrary. By documenting Claudia Jones’ activism in the CPUSA during the McCarthy era, scholarly evidence not only valorizes Jones but serves to diminish any suspicion of essentialism one might have regarding the black voice in the Communist movement. As an African-American woman, Claudia Jones passionately demonstrated her understanding of capitalistic oppression and how it functioned to triply oppress black women. In spite of a segregated, racist Jim Crow America, Claudia Jones not only flourished but thrived as a member of the CPUSA, in spite of harassment and oppression. It was largely of government oppression—not racism—that denied her success as a Marxist and obfuscated her from both memory and history.

## 2NC Cap

### Outweighs

#### Material impacts come before epistemology

Wapner 2003 Paul Wapner (associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University) Winter 2003 “Leftist criticism of” http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

### 2NC Cap Perm

#### Their demand that raps and spits be incorporated allows capitalism to coopt their affirmative- it takes those differences and incorporates them into its drive for accumulation

D’Annibale and McLaren ‘4 (Valerie Catamburio, PhD, chairs the Graduate Program in Communication and Social Justice at the University of Windsor, and Peter, professor in the Division of Urban Schooling, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, UCLA, “The Strategic Centrality of Class in the Politics of "Race" and "Difference”,” Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 148-175 (2003),)

Because post-al theories of difference often circumvent the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of difference from analyses of class formation and capitalist social relations, we contend that it is necessary to (re)conceptualize difference by drawing on Marx’s materialist and historical formulations. Difference needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions and in relation to political and economic organization. Because systems of difference almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference that exist in specific contexts. Drawing on the Marxist concept of mediation enables us to unsettle the categorical (and sometimes overly rigid) approaches to both class and difference for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies at the heart of our politics—that it was absurd to choose between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization, personal or collective will, and historical or structural determination. In a similar vein, it is equally absurd to see “difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation, development of capital and class politics” (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji has pointed to the need to historicize difference in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies) and to acknowledge the changing configurations of difference and “otherness.” Apprehending the meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the importance of exploring (a) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (b) the meanings and connotations that are attached to categories of difference; (c) how differences are produced out of, and lived within, specific historical, social, and political formations; and (d) the production of difference in relation to the complexities, contradictions, and exploitative relations of capitalism. Moreover, it presents a challenge to “identitarian” understandings of difference based almost exclusively on questions of cultural and/or racial hegemony. In such approaches, the answer to oppression often amounts to creating greater cultural space for the formerly excluded to have their voices heard (represented). Much of what is called the “politics of difference” is little more than a demand for an end to monocultural quarantine and for inclusion into the metropolitan salons of bourgeois representation—a posture that reinscribes a neoliberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free market capitalism. In short, the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace, and freedom amounts to the liberty of all vendors to display their different “cultural” goods. A paradigmatic expression of this position is encapsulated in the following passage that champions a form of difference politics whose presumed aim is to make social groups appear. Minority and immigrant ethnic groups have laid claim to the street as a legitimate forum for the promotion and exhibition of traditional dress, food, and culture. . . . [This] is a politics of visibility and invisibility. Because it must deal with a tradition of representation that insists on subsuming varied social practices to a standard norm, its struggle is as much on the page, screen . . . as it is at the barricade and in the parliament, traditional forums of political intervention before the postmodern. (Fuery & Mansfield, 2000, p. 150) This position fosters a “fetishized” understanding of difference in terms of primordial and seemingly autonomous cultural identities and treats such “differences” as inherent, as ontologically secure cultural traits of the individuals of particular cultural communities. Rather than exploring the construction of difference within specific contexts mediated by the conjunctural embeddedness of power differentials, we are instead presented with an overflowing cornucopia of cultural particularities that serve as markers of ethnicity, race, group boundaries, and so forth. In this instance, the discourse of difference operates ideologically—cultural recognition derived from the rhetoric of tolerance averts our gaze from relations of production and presents a strategy for attending to difference as solely an ethnic, racial, or cultural issue. What advocates of such an approach fail to acknowledge is that the forces of diversity and difference are allowed to flourish provided that they remain within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements. The neopluralism of difference politics cannot adequately pose a substantive challenge to the productive system of capitalism that is able to accommodate a vast pluralism of ideas and cultural practices. In fact, the post-al themes of identity, difference, diversity, and the like mesh quite nicely with contemporary corporate interests precisely because they revere lifestyle—the quest for, and the cultivation of, the self—and often encourage the fetishization of identities in the marketplace as they compete for “visibility” (Boggs, 2000; Field, 1997). Moreover, the uncritical, celebratory tone of various forms of difference politics can also lead to some disturbing conclusions. For example, if we take to their logical conclusion the statements that “postmodern political activism fiercely contests the reduction of the other to the same,” that post-al narratives believe that “difference needs to be recognized and respected at all levels” (Fuery &Mansfield, 2000, p. 148), and that the recognition of different subject positions is paramount (Mouffe, 1988, pp. 35-36), their political folly becomes clear. Eagleton (1996) sardonically commented on the implications: Almost all postmodern theorists would seem to imagine that difference, variability and heterogeneity are “absolute” goods, and it is a position I have long held myself. It has always struck me as unduly impoverishing of British social life that we can muster a mere two or three fascist parties. . . . The opinion that plurality is a good in itself is emptily formalistic and alarmingly unhistorical. (pp. 126-127) The liberal pluralism manifest in discourses of difference politics often means a plurality without conflict, contestation, or contradiction. The inherent limitations of this position are also evident if we turn our attention to issues of class. Expanding on Eagleton’s observations and adopting the logic that seems to inform the unqualified celebration of difference, one would be compelled to champion class differences as well. Presumably, the differences between the 475 billionaires whose combined wealth now equals the combined yearly incomes of more than 50% of the world’s population are to be celebrated—a posturing that would undoubtedly lend itself to a triumphant endorsement of capitalism and inequitable and exploitative conditions. San Juan (1995) noted that the cardinal flaw in current instantiations of culturalism lies in its decapitation of discourses of intelligibility from the politics of antagonistic relations. He framed the question quite pointedly: “In a society stratified by uneven property relations, by asymmetrical allocation of resources and of power, can there be equality of cultures and genuine toleration of differences?” (pp. 232- 233).

#### Their method cannot explain the material differences in colonial expansion of Europeans- Their theory would suggest Europeans would treat Native Americans and Africans the same- only materialism can explain why Europeans only settled on the North American continent- it was more like the European climate which meant similar diseases and farming techniques were relevant and the abundant inland waterways of North America made it ideal for the expansion of capital- whoever has the best explanation for exploitation should win because they are the ones with the most effective strategy for engagement

Tumino ‘1

[Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### Understanding economics and society as totalizing is the key methodological point of departure for understanding class relations

**Lukacs in 67** (George, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic. He is a founder of the tradition of Western Marxism. He contributed the ideas of reification and class consciousness to Marxist philosophy and theory, and his literary criticism was influential in thinking about realism and about the novel as a literary genre. He served briefly as Hungary's Minister of Culture as part of the government of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, History and Class Consciousness)

**Marx\*s dictum**: **"The relations of production of every society form a whole**"" **is the methodological point of departure and the key to the historical understanding of social relations**. **All the isolated partial categories can be thought of and treated**—in isolation—**as something that is always present in every society**. (If it cannot be found in a given society this is put down to \*chance\* as the exception that proves the rule.) **But the changes to which these individual aspects are subject give no clear and unambiguous picture of the real differences in the various stages of the evolution of society. These can really only be discerned in the context of the total historical process of their relation to society as a whole**. <7-8>

### A2: Policing

#### Their denouncement of our alternative as policing is a link- it allows capitalism to incorporate their criticism while maintaining squo material relations

Ebert and Zavarzadeh in 2008(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 36-38)

**The** cultural **activism of capital against labor**, however, **was not limited to conservative thinkers. It also** energetically **recruited Left intellectuals and "socialists of the** heart." The defense of free enterprise from the Left has always been of great cultural value to capitalism. **When Left intellectuals** defend the market directly-in the guise, for example, of "market socialism" (Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists, ed. Oilman; Why Market Socialism? Voices from Dissent, ed. Roosevelt and Belkin)--or **denounce the enemies of capital as totalitarian, as violators of human rights, and for repressing the play of cultural meanings and thus singularity and heterogeneity** (e.g., Sidney **Hook**, Emesto **Laclau**, Jean-Francois **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**), **their discourses seem more authoritative and sound more credible coming from the supposed critics of capital than do the discourses of conservative authors.** To put it precisely: **the Left has been valuable to capitalism because it has played a double role in legitimating capitalism. It has criticized capitalism as a culture, but has normalized it as an economic system** (e.g., Deleuze and Guat-tari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia;* Duncombe, ed., *Cultural Resistance Reader;* Kraus and Lotringer, eds., *Hatred of Capitalism).* **It** has **complained about capitalism's** so-called corporate **culture**, **but** has **normalized it as a system of wage-labor that** is **grounded on exchange-relations and produces the corporate culture**. **The normalization of capitalism by the Left takes many forms**, **but** all **involve the justification of exploitation, which the Left represents as redemptive. They are** all **versions**-with various degrees of conceptual complexity- -**of** Nicholas D. **Kristof's argument in** his "In **Praise of the Maligned Sweatshop**." **He writes that** the sweatshops in Africa set up by capitalists of the North are in fact "opportunities" and advises that "**anyone who cares about** fighting **poverty should campaign in favor of sweatshops**." His argument is summed up by two sentences printed in boldface and foregrounded in his essay: **"What's worse than being exploited? Not being exploited**" *(The New York Times,* 6 June 2006, A-21). **What** has **made this** double **role** of postwar Left writers **so effective for capitalism is the way their** innovative **writing**, unorthodox **uses of language, and** captivating **arguments have generated** intellectual **excitement**. Jean-Paul **Sartre**, Theodor **Adorno,** Jean-Francais **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**, Judith **Butler**, Jean **Baudrillard**, Jacques **Lacan**, Michel **Foucault**, Gilles **Deleuze**, Giorgio **Agamben**, Slavoj **Zizek**, **and** Stuart **Hall**, to name the most familiar authors, **have each used** quite **different**, **but** still **intellectually intriguing idioms**, **to de-historicize capitalism**. In highly subtle and nuanced arguments, **they have translated capitalism's Authoritarian economic practices**-which quietly force workers to concede to the exploitation of their labor-**into cultural values of free choice and self-sovereignty** (at the same time that they question traditional subjectivity). **Their most effective contributions to capitalism and its economic institutions have been to represent capitalism as a discursive system of meanings and** thus **divert attention away from its economic violence to its semantic transgressions-its homogenizing of meanings** in, for example, popular culture **or its erasure of difference** in cultural lifestyles. **They** have **criticized capitalism**, in other words, **for its** cultural **destruction of human imagination, but** at the same time, they **have condoned its logic of exploitation by dismantling** almost all **the conceptual apparatuses and analytics that offer a materialist understanding of capitalism as an economic system**. More specifically, **they have discredited any efforts to place class at the center of understanding**

 **and to grasp the extent and violence of labor practices**. They have done so, in the name of the "new" and with an ecstatic joy bordering on religious zeal (Ronell, *The Telephone Book;* Strangelove, *The Empire of Mind: Digital Piracy and the Anti-Capitalist Movement;* Gibson-Graham, *A Postcapitatist Politics).* **Left thinkers,** for example**, have argued that "new" changes in capitalism**-**the shift**, they claim, **from production to consumption**-**have triggered "a revolution in human thought around the idea of 'culture" which**, under new conditions, **has** itself **become material, "primary and constitutive"** (Hall, "The Centrality of Culture" 220, 215), **and is no** longer secondary and **dependent on** such outside **matters as relations of production**. Consequently, Hall and **others have argued that the analytics of base/superstructure has become irrelevant to sociocultural interpretations because the "new" conditions have rendered such concepts as objectivity, cause and effect, and materialism questionable.** "**The** old **distinction**" **between "**economic **'base' and** the ideological **'superstructure**" therefore **can no longer be sustained because the new culture is** what Fredric Jameson calls **"mediatic**" *(Postmodernism* 68). According to Hall, "media both form a critical part of the material infrastructure ... and are the principal means by which ideas and images are circulated" (Hall 209) . . . The logic of Hall's argument is obtained by treating the "material" as materialist. Media, however, are "material" only in a very trivial sense, they have a body of matter, and are a material vehicle (as a "medium"), but **media are not "materialist**" because, as we argue in our theory of materialism below, **they do not produce "value" and are not "productive." They distribute values produced at the point of production**. The un-said of Hall's claim is that **production and consumption/distribution are no longer distinguishable and more significantly, labor has itself become immaterial-**which is now a popular tenet in the cultural turn (Hardt and Negri, *Multitude).* But, even Paul Thompson, who is not without sympathy for the tum to culture, argues that **"labour is never immaterial. It is not the content of labour but its commodity form that gives 'weight' to an object or idea in a market economy,"** and, he adds, **While it is true that production has been deterritorialised** to an extent, **network firms are not a replacement for the assembly line and do not substitute horizontal for vertical forms of coordination**. Network firms are a type of extended hierarchy, based, as Harrison observes, on concentration without centralisation: 'production may be decentralised, while power finance, distribution, and control remain concentrated among the big firms' *(Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility,* 1994: 20). **Internal networks do not exist independently of these relations of production.** and forms of cooperation, such as teams, are set in motion and monitored by management rather than spontaneously formed. ("Foundation and Empire: A Critique of Hardt and Negri" 84) **Relations of production have shaped and will continue to shape the cultural superstructure. Changes in its phenomenology-**the textures of everyday lifestyles, whether one listens to music in a concert hall, on the radio, or through an iPod-**should not lead to postmodern** Quixotic **fantasies about the autonomy of culture from its material base** [Ebert, *Cultural Critique (with an attitude)].* As Marx writes, the Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor could the ancient world on politics. On the contrary, **it is the manner in which they gained their livelihood which explains why in one case politics, in the other case Catholicism, played the chief part** .... And then **there is** Don **Quixote who long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society**. (Marx, *Capital* l, 176).

 how to rule and how to resist.

# 1NR

### 2NC Overview

#### Our kritik outweighs and turns the case on epistemology – Hartmann-Maumud says using war as a metaphor for opposition to people or concepts becomes constitutive silences critical discourse – the case turn is unique because their literature base already expresses their thesis, but without trying to make it topical.

#### This is not a K of semantics--- their discussion of code switching and even the act of code switching is an implicit concession that linguistic structures are relevant to and constitute social reality

#### The links are clear--- When Shakur asserts that she is “at war” with the rich or TO PARAPHRASE “at war” with the forces that have raped women of color of their social value she is being literally MILITANT but is only metaphorically AT WAR--- our Mahmud evidence is a warrant as to why having a narrow notion of what constitutes war is good

#### Hartmann-Maumud uses drugs, poverty, population & terrorism examples to show that war metaphors turn solvency through simplicity, foreclose the political, and distraction from root causes – the affirmative embodies each of these disads (explain how)

SIMPLICITY: “At war with the rich” means you don’t talk about particular causes of social inequality such as low minimum wage, over imprisonment, etc.

APOLITICALITY: War is the inversion of politics--- prevents intergroup communication and actualization of their advocacy because it becomes treasonous to engage

ROOT CAUSE: War locks us into a tactical struggle that prizes short term gains over analysis of underlying systems--- the fact that they don’t focus on anti-blackness or white supremacy as structural problems but instead use inductive reasoning based on Shakur illustrates this

#### Our alt is a rejection alt, so vote negative if you think the 1AC would make a coherent argument without using war metaphors to hedge against topicality. Only 1AC impacts which require looking at the world through war metaphors can count as offense against us. The Lule card does show, however, that our critical rejection can dissolve the power of their war metaphors to make our offense unique.

### A2 Perms

#### K is mutually exclusive

#### Any perm-type arg is severance and severance perms should be treated as an affirmative concession of the debate – absent a plan text, the entire affirmative performance functions as their advocacy text.

#### The role of the ballot is to conduct a referendum on this specific move by the affirmative – if we win it harms their objectives, vote negative to counter-perm their case because the 1AC becomes negative offense. If they win the war metaphors are intrinsic to the case, the K instead nullifies solvency and functions as rule-utility based DA. Without clear offense proving the benefits of war metaphors outside the nation-state context, they have no win condition. There are authors who oppose Hartmann-Maumud’s argument.

#### If they win the aff as a performance, our counter performance is inherently competitive

Rashad Evans 10-14-2013

<https://www.facebook.com/groups/318979761518379/542109029205450/?comment_id=543413725741647&notif_t=like> “Neil Berch: It seems pretty clear…”

Counter performances are always competitive. Performance based framework recognizes that there is always a forced choice between the the two teams and the ballot can only be awarded to one team. This is why permutations are problematic. Therefore, if the negative offers up a performance of there own with its own benefits that are more beneficial. The affirmative cannot say: we permute your performance because we could have done that too. In addition, while I loathe role of the ballot arguments, they immediately set of competition in the same way that plan focus does because it identifies what the debate must be about which always allows the negative to say this debate should be about X. You say the role of the ballot is who best X; we say the role of the ballot is who best challenges Y.

### A2 Ontology

#### The K is a prior question – their method accesses only experience, but experience is situated inside a lifeworld constituted by metaphor – this also functions to refute their assertion that white supremacy is epistemic, as that assertion cannot account for metaphoric changes even though our K can explain any data they produce to suggest white supremacy exists

Zavadil, Jeffery. Department of Political Science Arizona State University "New Metaphor Theories: Implications for Interpretation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, TBA, TBA, Jan 05, 2006 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p68744_index.html>

<http://www.allacademic.com/one/prol/prol01/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished_manuscript&file_index=2&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_style=attachment&PHPSESSID=0ee4aefbd44f4a79a340bfcb90c16143>

What I am adding to this definition is the claim that these latent beliefs are metaphors. That is, the lifeworld consists of an accumulation of metaphors, a stock of standard images shared intersubjectively by a discourse community which forms the background context by which they comprehend the world. Let me be more precise: conventional metaphors make up the intersubjective lifeworld; novel metaphors are the way that new meanings are added to that lifeworld. That is why for so long conventional metaphors were conceived of as “dead” metaphors which had in some way become literal. The set of conventional metaphors that make up the lifeworld are taken-forgranted, usually go unnoticed and unquestioned, and even today are widely thought to be literal. Yet metaphors they remain, and they form the world-views of individual members of a culture by providing standard, conventional patterns of imagery according to which most experience is comprehended. They are passed from person to person and generation to generation, and they change as new metaphors are added to the lifeworld or old ones modified. Saying that metaphors constitute the lifeworld is, I think, a concise way of summing up what new metaphor theories have been saying: the creation and sharing of meaning is done metaphorically and intersubjectively. “Metaphor constitutes meaning” – that is to say: metaphor is cognitive, and also of the lifeworld.

### A2 CS

#### We are impact turning any code that includes war metaphors--- not all metaphors are bad, in fact there are lots of useful metaphors in their spits that illustrate concepts--- we are embracing those metaphors and saying particular forms of the code are bad

#### Metaphor constitutes ontology – ontology is built in metaphoric maps (prior to language/CS)

George Lakoff 1993 California, Berkeley linguistics professor

METAPHOR AND THOUGHT SECOND EDITION edited by Andrew Ortony 1993

Let us now turn to some examples that are illustrative of contemporary metaphor research. They will mostly come from the domain of everyday conventional metaphor, since that has been the main focus of the research. I will turn to the discussion of poetic metaphor only after I have discussed the conventional system, since knowledge of the conventional system is needed to make sense of most of the poetic cases. The evidence for the existence of a system of conventional conceptual metaphors is of five types: Generalizations governing polysemy, that is, the use of words with a number of related meanings Generalizations governing inference patterns, that is, cases where a pattern of inferences from one conceptual domain is used in another domain Generalizations governing novel metaphorical language (see Lakoff & Turner, 1989) Generalizations governing patterns of semantic change (see Sweetser, 1990) Psycholinguistic experiments (see Gibbs, 1990a; 1990b) We will be discussing primarily the first three of these sources of evidence, since they are the most robust. Imagine a love relationship described as follows: Our relationship has hit a dead-end street. Here love is being conceptualized as a journey, with the implication that the relationship is stalled, that the lovers cannot keep going the way they've been going, that they must turn back, or abandon the relationship altogether. This is not an isolated case. English has many everyday expressions that are based on a conceptualization of love as a journey, and they are used not just for talking about love, but for reasoning about it as well. Some are necessarily about love; others can be understood that way: Look how far we've come. It's been a long, bumpy road. We can't turn back now. We're at a crossroads. We may have to go our separate ways. The relationship isn't going anywhere. We're spinning our wheels. Our relationship is off the track. The marriage is on the rocks. We may have to bail out of this relationship. These are ordinary, everyday English expressions. They are not poetic, nor are they necessarily used for special rhetorical effect. Those like look how far we've come, which aren't necessarily about love, can readily be understood as being about love. As a linguist and a cognitive scientist, I ask two commonplace questions: Is there a general principle governing how these linguistic expressions about journeys are used to characterize love? Is there a general principle governing how our patterns of inference about journeys are used to reason about love when expressions such as these are used? The answer to both is yes. Indeed, there is a single general principle that answers both questions, but it is a general principle that is neither part of the grammar of English, nor the English lexicon. Rather, it is part of the conceptual system underlying English. It is a principle for understanding the domain of love in terms of the domain of journeys. The principle can be stated informally as a metaphorical scenario: The lovers are travelers on a journey together, with their common life goals seen as destinations to be reached. The relationship is their vehicle, and it allows them to pursue those common goals together. The relationship is seen as fulfilling its purpose as long as it allows them to make progress toward their common goals. The journey isn't easy. There are impediments, and there are places (crossroads) where a decision has to be made about which direction to go in and whether to keep traveling together. The metaphor involves understanding one domain of experience, love, in terms of a very different domain of experience, journeys. More technically, the metaphor can be understood as a mapping (in the mathematical this case, love). The mapping is tightly structured. There are ontological correspondences, according to which entities in the domain of love (e.g., the lovers, their common goals, their difficulties, the love relationship, etc.) correspond systematically to entities in the domain of a journey (the travelers, the vehicle, destinations, etc.). To make it easier to remember what mappings there are in the conceptual system, Johnson and I (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) adopted a strategy for naming such mappings, using mnemonics which suggest the mapping. Mnemonic names typically (though not always) have the form: TARGET-DOMAIN IS SOURCE-DOMAIN, or alternatively, TARGET-DOMAIN AS SOURCE-DOMAIN. In this case, the name of the mapping is LOVE IS A JOURNEY. When I speak of the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, I am using a mnemonic for a set of ontological correspondences that characterize a mapping, namely: THE LOVE-AS-JOURNEY MAPPING The lovers correspond to travelers. The love relationship corresponds to the vehicle. The lovers' common goals correspond to their common destinations on the journey. Difficulties in the relationship correspond to impediments to travel. It is a common mistake to confuse the name of the mapping, LOVE IS A JOURNEY, for the mapping itself. The mapping is the set of correspondences. Thus, whenever I refer to a metaphor by a mnemonic like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, I will be referring to such a set of correspondences. If mappings are confused with names of mappings, another misunderstanding can arise. Names of mappings commonly have a propositional form, for example, LOVE IS A JOURNEY. But the mappings themselves are not propositions. If mappings are confused with names for mappings, one might mistakenly think that, in this theory, metaphors are propositional. They are anything but that: metaphors are mappings, that is, sets of conceptual correspondences. The LOVE-AS-JOURNEY mapping is a set of ontological correspondences that characterize epistemic correspondences by mapping knowledge about journeys onto knowledge about love. Such correspondences permit us to reason about love using the knowledge we use to reason about journeys. Let us take an example. Consider the expression, "we're stuck," said by one lover to another about their relationship. How is this expression about travel to be understood as being about their relationship? "We're stuck" can be used of travel, and when it is, it evokes knowledge about travel. The exact knowledge may vary from person to person, but here is a typical example of the kind of knowledge evoked. The capitalized expressions represent entities in the ontology of travel, that is, in the source domain of the LOVE-IS-A-JOURNEY mapping given above. Two TRAVELERS are in a VEHICLE, TRAVELING WITH COMMON DESTINATIONS. The VEHICLE encounters some IMPEDIMENT and gets stuck, that is, becomes nonfunctional, If the travelers do nothing, they will not REACH THEIR DESTINATIONS. There are a limited number of alternatives for action: They can try to get the vehicle moving again, either by fixing it or getting it past the IMPEDIMENT that stopped it. They can remain in the nonfunctional VEHICLE and give up on REACHING THEIR DESTINATIONS. They can abandon the VEHICLE. The alternative of remaining in the nonfunctional VEHICLE takes the least effort, but does not satisfy the desire to REACH THEIR DESTINATIONS. The ontological correspondences that constitute the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor map the ontology of travel onto the ontology of love. In doing so, they map this scenario about travel onto a corresponding love scenario in which the corresponding alternatives for action are seen. Here is the corresponding love scenario that results from applying the correspondences to this knowledge structure. The target domain entities that are mapped by the correspondences are capitalized: Two LOVERS are in a LOVE RELATIONSHIP, PURSUING COMMON LIFE GOALS. The RELATIONSHIP encounters some DIFFICULTY, which makes it nonfunctional. If they do nothing, they will not be able to ACHIEVE THEIR LIFE GOALS. There are a limited number of alternatives for action: They can try to get it moving again, either by fixing it or getting it past the DIFFICULTY. They can remain in the nonfunctional RELATIONSHIP, and give up on ACHIEVING THEIR LIFE GOALS. They can abandon the RELATIONSHIP. The alternative of remaining in the nonfunctional RELATIONSHIP takes the least effort, but does not satisfy the desire to ACHIEVE LIFE GOALS. This is an example of an inference pattern that is mapped from one domain to another. It is via such mappings that we apply knowledge about travel to love relationships. Metaphors are not mere words What constitutes the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is not any particular word or expression. It is the ontological mapping across conceptual domains, from the source domain of journeys to the target domain of love. The metaphor is not just a matter of language, but of thought and reason. The language is secondary. The mapping is primary, in that it sanctions the use of source domain language and inference patterns for target domain concepts. The mapping is conventional, that is, it is a fixed part of our conceptual system, one of our conventional ways of conceptualizing love relationships. This view of metaphor is thoroughly at odds with the view that metaphors are just linguistic expressions. If metaphors were merely linguistic expressions, we would expect different linguistic expressions to be different metaphors. Thus, "We've hit a dead-end street" would constitute one metaphor. "We can't turn back now" would constitute another, entirely different metaphor. "Their marriage is on the rocks" would involve still a different metaphor. And so on for dozens of examples. Yet we don't seem to have dozens of different metaphors here. We have one metaphor, in which love is conceptualized as a journey. The mapping tells us precisely how love is being conceptualized as a journey. And this unified way of conceptualizing love metaphorically is realized in many different linguistic expressions. It should be noted that contemporary metaphor theorists commonly use the term "metaphor" to refer to the conceptual mapping, and the term "metaphorical expression" to refer to an individual linguistic expression (like dead-end street) that is sanctioned by a mapping. We have adopted this terminology for the following reason: Metaphor, as a phenomenon, involves both conceptual mappings and individual linguistic expressions. It is important to keep them distinct. Since it is the mappings that are primary and that state the generalizations that are our principal concern, we have reserved the term "metaphor" for the mappings, rather than for the linguistic expressions. In the literature of the field, small capitals like LOVE IS A JOURNEY are used as mnemonics to name mappings. Thus, when we refer to the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, we are referring to the set of correspondences discussed above. The English sentence "love is a journey," on the other hand, is a metaphorical expression that is understood via that set of correspondences.